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Abstract:
Purpose: The Ministry of  Finance issued the new China accounting standards on February 15,
2006(CAS2006), which requires the listed companies to use the balance sheet liability method
for the income tax accounting. Thus, it gives us an opportunity to investigate the earnings
management of  listed companies from the perspective of  income tax. Under the balance sheet
liability method, our researches just try to investigate the relationship between the listed
companies’ income tax planning and earnings management. 
Design/methodology/approach: Our research approach combines theoretical analysis and
empirical analysis. This paper first makes a deep theoretical analysis on the listed companies’
choice between pretax earnings management activities and earnings management activities, and
then we exemplify our theory. Next, we come up with two hypotheses based on the theoretical
analysis, build up a restatement model and conduct the empirical examination. The empirical
analysis employs the method of  descriptive statistics and logistic regression. 
Findings: When engaging in earnings management, listed companies will trade off
conforming and nonconforming earnings management from the perspective of  income tax
cost. We find that managers’ motivations and purposes will influence the choice. When the
company has motivations to turn losses into gains and has motivations to avoid penalty cost
-417-
Journal of Industrial Engineering and Management – http://dx.doi.org/10.3926/jiem.1310
associated with fraud being found, the company prefers to employ more conforming earnings
management strategies.
Research limitations/implications: The limitation in our research is as follows. First, we
mainly focus on the conforming and nonconforming earnings management when the listed
companies restate their financial statements. However after the issue of  CAS2006, many listed
companies still not disclose income tax account, which restrict our sample. Second, without the
acquisition of  private companies’ data, our empirical results may have some errors. We will
solve these problems in our future study.
Practical/social implications: First of  all, our research provides new perspective and
theoretical evidence for exploring the listed companies’ choice of  conforming and
nonconforming earnings management. Meanwhile, our results are helpful for regulators to
strengthen the administration of  listed companies’ restatement. Finally, our results will help us
to deeply understand the impact of  the accounting processes of  income tax under the balance
sheet liability method on the listed companies.
Originality/value: So far, there are few studies discussing the choice of  earnings management
strategies and how different purposes and motivations affect the choice from the perspective
of  income tax. The issue of  CAS2006 offers an opportunity for this research. This paper use
restatement as sample to investigate the choice of  conforming earnings management and
nonconforming earnings management under different motivations and purposes for the first
time.
Keywords: earnings management, book-tax differences, deferred tax expense
1. Introduction
With the stakeholders pay more attention to earnings information, earnings management
prevail among the listed companies. But there is no doubt that it decreases the quality of listed
companies’ financial information and whitewashed earnings information can’t fairly reflect
firms’ financial status and operating results, which hurts the interests of information users. So
it is especially important to study on earnings management, and the implement of the
CAS2006 highlights the importance of our study at the same time.
The Ministry of Finance issued the CAS2006 on February 15, 2006, which consists of the basic
criteria, 38 specific criteria and application guide for criteria. CAS2006 require the listed
companies to use balance sheet liability approach to conduct tax income accounting, and firstly
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introduce the concept of assets, liabilities tax basis and confirm deferred tax assets, deferred
liabilities on the basis of ‘Asset-Liability View’. There are some huge differences in the concepts
and methods of tax accounting between the balance sheet liability approach and the taxes
payable methods or tax effect accounting, thus the new standards provide new space for the
options of earnings management strategies. National People's Congress passes the “PRC
Enterprise Income Tax Law” on March 16, 2007 and the law is implemented from January 1,
2008. Tax will not only affects companies’ profits, but also be closely related to firms’ earnings
management activities. Different earnings management strategies have different tax cost and
the amount of income tax that needs to pay in current period will also vary. Besides, the
amount of income tax that needs to pay is closely related to firms’ free cash flow. On one
hand, the amount of income tax that needs to pay in current period is firms’ cash outflow
which decrease the net amount of cash flow generated from the business activities and thus
decrease the free cash flow. On the other hand, the level of free cash flow restricts the amount
of income tax that needs to pay and thus influences firms’ choice of earnings management
strategies, for example, when a firm has the high level of free cash flow, which means the cash
that can be available to pay for income tax is sufficient, the firm won’t care the amount of
income tax that need to pay in current period. So because income tax cost is associated with
earnings management, firms need to choose conforming earnings management and/or
nonconforming earnings management. It is clear that the promulgation of CAS2006 and the
implementation of the tax law provide the background for our study.
Presently, the researches of earnings management in academia mostly focus on the cost,
motivations, means and results of earnings management. There are few studies discuss the
choice of earnings management strategies and the different purposes and motivations that
affect the choice from the perspective of income taxes. We try to explore the choice of
different earnings management strategies and the motivations that affect the choice from the
perspective of the income tax. We not only investigate the effect of earnings management on
income tax, but also the effect of different earnings management motivations on the choice of
earnings management strategies.
In addition, our sample offers the potential for this study. Consistent with Erickson, Hanlon and
Maydew (2004), income-increasing conforming earnings management results in a downward
restatement of current tax expense as well as pretax income. Consistent with Phillips, Pincus
and Rego (2003), income-increasing nonconforming earnings management results in a
downward restatement of deferred tax expense and pretax income. Restatement companies
that managed pretax earnings upward in ways that create permanent book-tax differences
would restate pretax income downward, but not restate either current or deferred tax expense.
By definition, companies that manage earnings in such a manner do not incur any current or
deferred income tax costs related to the earnings management. We measure this type of
pretax earnings management by our misstatement companies and find little evidence of such
activity, consistent with companies having limited opportunities to engage in this type of
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earnings management. Accordingly, we focus on nonconforming earnings management that
creates temporary book-tax differences and thus greater deferred tax expense. Hence,
restatements of income tax accounts reveal the type of pretax earnings management (i.e.,
book-tax conforming or nonconforming) that managers employ. Based on this, we choose
misstatement firms as our sample, which enable us to investigate the choice of conforming and
nonconforming earnings management through measuring the differences of tax account
between originally reported and restated financial statements, and to measure the amount of
pretax earnings management more accurately. Restating financial results can presumably still
reflect unacknowledged earnings management, nonetheless, we assume that restated amounts
reflect strictly less earnings management than the amounts companies originally reported.
2. Prior Research
Our study builds upon several streams of researches, including studies that investigate
earnings management accomplished via book-tax conforming and nonconforming strategies.
Scholes, Wilson and Woflson (1990), Matsunaga, Shevlin and Shores (1992), and Dhaliwal,
Frankel and Trezevant (1994) focus on book-tax conforming upward earnings management,
which increases both financial and taxable incomes and thus has current tax consequences.
That is, conforming earnings management includes any transaction that has the same impact
on the current financial and taxable incomes. A common example of conforming earnings
management is accelerating revenue recognition by recording receivables sooner than
justifying and postponing inventory purchases under LIFO.
In contrast, Mills and Newberry (2001), Joos, Pratt and Young (2003), Phillips, Pincus and Rego
(2003) and Phillips, Pincus, Rego and Wan (2004) focus on nonconforming upward earnings
management, which increases financial accounting income with no current tax consequences.
This type of earnings management includes transactions that accelerate revenue recognition or
defer expense recognition for financial reporting purposes relative to tax purposes, such as
aggressively recognizing unearned revenue, extending the useful lives of depreciable assets, or
reducing the provision for doubtful accounts for financial reporting purposes.
Frank, Lynch and Rego (2009) find that previous studies conclude that firms will make a trade-
off between increase financial incomes and decrease taxable incomes. In fact, this
understanding is based on the consistence between accounting and tax rules, that is, firms
need to pay high tax cost for increasing financial incomes. But with the book-tax differences,
which tends to expand, and managers’ discretion given by CAS2006, firms are able to increase
financial incomes without increasing taxable incomes, that is, pay little or no tax cost for
increasing financial incomes.
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Ye (2006) investigates the trade-off between the cost of financial report and income tax based
on A-shares manufacturing firms’ data. The empirical results show that the more earnings
listed companies’ managers manage, the higher the book-tax differences are, which means the
listed companies accomplish earnings management via nonconforming earnings management
to avoid income tax cost, but results also show that the avoidance is limited.
Liang (2010) concludes that no matter what the goal of earnings management is, listed
companies prefer to earnings management strategies accompanying "zero tax cost".
Long and Chen (2010) use book-tax difference to measure earnings management. Based on
the listed companies’ data in stock markets of Shanghai and Shenzhen from 2000 to 2006,
they find that the book-tax differences are significantly different in firms with different
ownership structure and private listed companies with system whereby state-owned
enterprises pay tax plus a percentage of profits will pay more attention to trade-off cost of
financial report and income tax and thus tend to choose nonconforming strategies when
engaging in earnings management activities.
Hu (2010) confirms that in order to make the right decisions, firms have the motivation to
avoid income tax cost through nonconforming earning management and the higher the degree
of earnings management and the tax rate is, the higher earnings firms manage through
nonconforming earnings management. The study also finds that income tax cost evaded by
this approach is extremely limited and it perhaps reveals that firms in fact pay income tax cost
for most earnings management.
The above studies examine the relationship between earnings and income tax and the balance
of financial reporting and income tax costs, but few domestic researches reflect earnings
management behavior by financial restatements, also few are based on the differences of
income tax account between originally reported and restated financial statements to
investigate firms’ choice among different earnings management strategies and how manager's
motivations and purposes influence this choice. Relative to previous studies, we estimate the
choice of conforming earnings management and nonconforming earning management from the
perspective of income tax and we use the changes in current and deferred tax expense
disclosed in earnings’ restatements to measure conforming and nonconforming earnings
management.
3. Theoretical Analysis
Based on the treatment of book-tax differences using the balance sheet liability method, this
article analyzes the effect that different earnings management strategies have on book-tax
differences and the level of income tax burden under different earnings management
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strategies. We conclude that when manage earnings, managers tend to choose nonconforming
earnings management strategies from the perspective of income tax.
3.1. Treatment of Book-Tax Differences
Figure 1 schematically illustrates the accounting processes of Corporate Income Tax under the
balance sheet liability method. The balance sheet liability method means starting from the
balance sheet, recognizing taxable temporary differences and deductible temporary differences
by comparing difference between the book value that is determined in accordance with GAAP
and tax basis that is determined according to the provisions of the Income Tax Law and then
recognizing deferred income tax liabilities and deferred income tax assets and thus
determining the income tax expense for each period. Shown in Figure 1, when companies
engage in earnings management, managers can choose conforming earnings management
strategies, strategies affect both accounting profit and taxable income and thus have effect on
current income tax expense without having effect on deferred income tax expense, and they
can also choose nonconforming earnings management strategies, strategies only affect
accounting profit and don’t affect taxable income and thus have effect on deferred income tax
expense without having effect on current income tax expense. Of course, companies can adopt
both two kinds of earnings management strategies. The two earnings management strategies
have different influence on current income tax expense. Thus, the company can decrease the
current period’s tax payable through choosing different earnings management.
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Figure 1. The accounting processes of corporate income tax
3.2. Earnings Management Strategies and Book-Tax Differences
With the steady progress in the reform process of CAS, companies get more opportunities to
choose accounting policies and accounting estimates, these factors led to the differences
between Chinese listed companies’ accounting profits and taxable income. And this also result
in the increase of managers’ choice of earnings management strategies. This paper mainly
discusses the relationship between the choice of different earnings management strategies,
conforming earnings management strategies and nonconforming earnings management
strategies, and book-tax differences. We focus on earnings management bringing temporary
differences, because companies rarely have the opportunity to engage in earnings
management generating permanent differences. When companies engaged in conforming
earnings management strategies, the book-tax differences will be generated, while when
companies engaged in nonconforming earnings management strategies, the book-tax
differences will not be generated. And the more nonconforming earnings management
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strategies companies engaged in, the greater the book-tax differences are. We illustrate the
relationship between the two different earnings management strategies and book-tax
temporary differences through the following example.
Assume that in the current year t and also in year t + n, both company A and company B have
￥ 1000 of "true" pretax book income. The company A engages in ￥ 100 of earnings
management through a conforming manner and thus originally reports ￥1100 of pretax income
in year t. While the company B engages in ￥ 100 of earnings management through a
nonconforming manner and thus also originally reports ￥1100 of pretax income in year t. As a
result, the changes in the two companies’ book-tax differences and income tax expenses
before and after engaging in earnings management is as follows (the income tax rate is 25
percent):
Company A Company B
Accounting profit 1,100 1,100
Taxable income 1,100 1,000
Current income tax payable 275 250
Book-tax differences 0 100
Deferred tax expenses 0 25
Table 1. After engaging in earnings management. (Unit: million)
 Company A Company B
Accounting profit 1,000 1,000
Taxable income 1,000 1,000
Current income tax payable 250 250
Book-tax differences 0 0
Deferred tax expenses 0 0
Table 2. Before engaging in earnings management. (Unit: million)
As shown in Table 1 and Table 2, conforming earnings management will not cause book-tax
differences, but it will affect taxable income and thus this earnings management strategy only
affects current income tax payable and has no effect on deferred income tax expense. In the
contrary, nonconforming earnings management will cause book-tax differences, but it will not
affect taxable income and thus this earnings management strategy only affects deferred
income tax expense and having no effect on current income tax payable.
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3.3. Earnings Management and Income Tax Burden
In the capital market, the management of listed companies often engaged in earnings
management consciously for the purpose of financing, contract or political control (Healy &
Wahlen, 1999). However, earnings management is not without cost, in addition to potential
legal costs, one of the direct costs of earnings management is the income tax cost: when the
management attempt to increase profits through earnings management, they often need to
pay more income tax for the increasing profit. Therefore, in most cases, when companies
increase profits through earnings management, the income tax burden will be affected.
Exclude minority earnings management producing permanent differences, compared to
conforming earnings management, nonconforming earnings management can bring income tax
benefit. Follow the above example:
Assuming both company A and company B reverse the temporary differences in the year t + n.
Since company A performs earnings management in a conforming manner, company A would
incur income tax costs of ￥ 275 in year t ( ￥ 1100×25 percent) and ￥ 225 in year t + n
(￥900 ×25 percent). The present value of income tax costs would be ￥275 + [￥225 / (1+r)n],
where r is company’s discount rate. Company B performs earnings management in a
nonconforming manner, company B would incur income tax costs of ￥250 in year t (￥1000×25
percent) and ￥ 250 in year t + n ( ￥ 1000 ×25 percent) since nonconforming earnings
management does not affect taxable income (in this case, ￥ 1000). The present value of
income tax costs would be ￥250 + [￥250/ (1+r)n], where r is the company’s discount rate.
The income tax benefit from engaging in nonconforming versus conforming upward earnings
management equals the net present value of income tax benefits from doing so, i.e., the
present value of income tax costs associated with conforming earning management minus the
present value of income tax costs associated with nonconforming earnings management. This
amount is computed as:
{￥275 + [￥225 / (1+r)n] } - {￥250 + [￥250/ (1+r)n]}= ￥25 - [￥25/ (1+r)n].
It can be seen that, the present value of income tax costs associated with nonconforming
earning management is lower than that of income tax costs associated with conforming
earning management, that is, compared to company A, company B can bring income tax
benefits. Thus, companies can achieve the purpose of reducing the income tax burden through
the choice of conforming earning management and nonconforming earning management.
-425-
Journal of Industrial Engineering and Management – http://dx.doi.org/10.3926/jiem.1310
4. Research Design
4.1. Hypothesis
Book-tax conforming upward earnings management increases both financial and taxable
incomes and thus has current tax consequences; nonconforming upward earnings
management increases financial accounting income but has no current tax consequences.
Compared to conforming upward earnings management, nonconforming earnings management
can decrease current income tax expense and thus increase firms’ cash flow, so firms prefer to
manage earnings upward in a nonconforming manner to avoid income tax cost. We suppose
managers’ motivations and purposes influence the choice. When firms are facing punishment
of the suspension or termination of the listing for three consecutive losses, firms will have a
great incentive to manage earnings in order to turn losses into gains. Thus, when firms have
motivations to turn losses into gains, firms can’t wait to manage earnings to increase incomes
and won’t consider income tax cost too much. And if they employ nonconforming earnings
management which bring greater book-tax differences, it may increase the probability of being
detected and earnings management behavior may also be found. Thus, we predict that in this
motivation, listed companies will employ more conforming earnings management. Therefore,
the hypothesis 1 is:
H1：When the firm has motivations to turn losses into gains, the firm prefers to employ
more conforming earnings management strategies.
It can be seen that, conforming earnings management don’t generate book-tax difference,
while nonconforming earning management generate book-tax difference and the greater the
earnings management degree is, the greater the difference is. The book-tax difference tends to
attract regulatory agencies’ attention, as Frank, Lynch and Rego (2006) think it will attract
attention of SEC, so the detection cost associated with nonconforming earnings management is
greater than that with conforming. We think that the greater the detection cost associated with
nonconforming earnings management is, the less the earnings firms manage in a
nonconforming manner. And we use fraud as proxy for detection cost, thus, when the firms
engage in fraudulent activities (the detection cost is greater), they prefer to employ more
conforming earnings management strategies. On the other hand, if firms engaging in
fraudulent activities employ nonconforming earnings management bringing greater book-tax
difference which is easy to attract regulatory agencies’ attention, the fraud may be found.
Therefore, the firms engaging in fraudulent activities will employ more conforming earnings
management strategies to avoid penalty cost associated with fraud being found. Therefore, the
hypothesis 2 is:
H2：When the firm has the motivation to avoid penalty cost associated with fraud being
found, the firm prefers to employ more conforming earnings management strategies.
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4.2. Sample
Chinese listed companies began to implement CAS2006 in 2007 and companies generally
restate financial statements in the year following the misstatement period. Thus, we think that
only restatements in 2008 and after 2008 can offer the data we need. Base on this, we identify
misstatement firms (i.e., firms that restated their financial statements in a subsequent year)
as the A-share listed company's report in Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchange from 2008
to 2010, the data comes from CSMAR.
We first get 435 misstatement firms as sample. The restatements corrected previous material
misstatements of financial statement numbers caused by accounting irregularities. We
manually collect the following variables from both the originally reported and restated financial
statements: total assets, pretax net income and restated income, current tax expense,
deferred tax expense from operations. Then we lose 202 firms without above variables data.
We finally get our misstatement sample consisting of 223 misstatement firms.
4.3. Model and Variable Definitions
4.3.1. Model
To explore managers’ different motivations and purposes that impact the choice of conforming
and nonconforming earnings management (H1 and H2), we estimate the following regression
model: 
NONCON_EM = a0 + a1 TLTGi + a2 FRAUDi + a3 LAG_DTEi + a4 LNLAG_TAi + 
a5 REV_ONLYi + a6 EXP_ONLYi + εi
(1)
Where:
NONCON_EM equals 1 if the firm employs nonconforming earnings management, and 0
otherwise;
TLTG equals 1 if the firm turns losses into gains in year t, and 0 otherwise;
FRAUD equals 1 if the firm engages in fraudulent activities in year t, and 0 otherwise;
LAG_DTE equals deferred tax expense in year t-1, scaled by total assets at year-end
t-2;
LAG_TA equals the logarithm of total assets at year-end t-1;
REV_ONLY equals 1 if the firm only restates revenue accounts in year t, and 0
otherwise;
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EXP_ONLY equals 1 if the firm only restates expense accounts in year t, and 0
otherwise;
Year t is the year in which firm restates its financial statements. When firm restates
multiple years’ financial statements, year t is the first misstatement year.
4.3.2. Variable Definitions
NONCON_EM, which is the dependent variable in Model (1), is used to measure the
restatement firm employs nonconforming earnings management. Specially, if the firm only
restates deferred income tax expense, we can judge that it employs nonconforming earnings
management; if the firm only restates current income tax expense, we can judge that it
employs conforming earnings management; if the firm not only restates deferred income tax
expense, but also restates current income tax expense, we need to compare the relative
amount of the differences of current and deferred tax expense account between originally
reported and restated financial statements to judge which type of earnings management it is
engaged in and when the amount of difference in deferred tax expense is greater than that in
current tax expense, we think the firm employs nonconforming earnings management.
TLTG, which is the independent variable in Model (1), is used to measure whether the
restatement firm has the motivation to turn losses into gains in the year that the misstatement
occurs. If the firm’s pretax net income that disclosed in originally financial statement is positive
but negative in restated financial statement, we can judge that the firm has the motivation to
turn losses into gains.
FRAUD, which is the independent variable in Model (1), is used to measure whether the firm
has the motivation to avoid penalty cost associated with fraud being found. If there are words
"fraud", "fiction", "published by SFC or the tax authorities" or "special inspected or questioned
by independent third party, such as SASAC, the Ministry of Finance, the Audit Committee, the
independent directors" in all restatement firms’ misstatement information, we think that the
firm engages in fraud.
Consistent with H1 and H2, we believe the coefficients of a1 and a2 in Model (1) are negative,
that is, the listed firms engage in more conforming earnings management. 
Because there are likely different costs and benefits associated with different types of earnings
management, we include two additional indicator variables in model (1), one for
misstatements only involving revenue recognition (REV_ONLY) and the other for misstatement
only involving expense recognition (EXP_ONLY). If there is a systematic relation between
revenue and expense management, whether such earnings management is achieved via a
conforming or nonconforming manner, our results could be biased. Thus, we introduce
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variables REV_ONLY and EXP_ONLY to control a possible link between earnings management
type (conforming or nonconforming) and the type of account managed (revenue-only and
expense-only) in our multivariate analysis.
Finally, we include LNLAG_TA, the Logarithm of total assets at year-end t-1, to control firm
size. Because compared to relative little firms, large firms’ operating, financing, and investing
activities are more complex, they have more opportunity to manage earnings. In addition,
because large deferred tax expense in the year prior to the misstatement period limits the
firm’ ability to engage in more nonconforming earning management in the misstatement year,
we also include LAG_DTE, deferred tax expense in the year prior to the misstatement period,
to control for the prior year’s nonconforming earnings management.
5. The Empirical Results
5.1. Descriptive Statistics
Table 3 shows the descriptive statistics of NONCON_EM by TLTG, FRAUD classification. The
descriptive statistics show that, on the one hand, the mean of NONCON_EM is less than
0.5when the firm engages in fraudulent activities and turns losses into gains. Even in the
presence of permanent differences (as already said the case is relatively less), we can also
consider the mean of NONCON_EM is less than the mean of CON_EM. More importantly, on the
other hand, when the FRAUD and TLTG varies from 0 to 1, the means of NONCON_EM are
smaller. These all show that when the firm engages in fraudulent activities and turns losses
into gains, the firm prefers to employ less nonconforming earnings management strategies.
The two aspects indicate that when the firm has motivations to turn losses into gains and has
the motivation to avoid penalty cost associated with fraud being found, the firm prefers to
employ more conforming earnings management strategies.
NONCON-EM
Mean Std.
TLTG=0 0.39 0.489
TLTG=1 0.09 0.302
FRAUD=0 0.4 0.491
FRAUD=1 0.3 0.463
Note: NONCON_EM, which represents nonconforming earnings management, equals 1 if the firm
employs nonconforming earnings management, and 0 otherwise. TLTG, which represents turning
losses into gains, equals 1 if the firm turns losses into gains in year t, and 0 otherwise. FRAUD,
which represents fraudulent activities, equals 1 if the firm engages in fraudulent activities in
year t, and 0 otherwise.
Table 3. Descriptive statistics of NONCON-EM
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Table 4 presents Pearson correlation test of the variables in the Model (1). The results show
that two test variables, TLTG and FRUAD, are negatively related to the dependent variable
(NONCON_EM), which is consistent with the hypothesis. It is noteworthy that the correlation
coefficient between each variable is small, which explains that the Model (1) doesn’t exist large
linear problems.
NONCON_EM TLTG FRAUD REV_ONLY LNLAG_TA EXP_ONLY LAG_DTE
NONCON-EM 1       
TLTG -0.132 1      
FRUAD -0.084 -0.116 1     
REV-ONLY 0.153 -0.041 0.304 1    
LNLAG_TA 0.158 -0.129 0.091 0.123 1   
EXP_ONLY -0.154 0.035 0.038 -0.525 -0.116 1  
LAG_DTE 0.058 -0.020 0.174 0.073 -0.038 0.035 1
Table 4. Correlation test
5.2. Multivariate Testing
Table 5 reflects the main regression results of the Model (1) and the results reflect the test of
both H1 and H2. As can be seen, the coefficients of TLTG and FRAUD are significantly negative
which are consistent with our expectations. As predicted by H1, when the firm has motivations
to turn losses into gains, the firm prefers to employ more conforming earnings management
strategies. As predicted by H2, when the firm has the motivation to avoid penalty cost
associating with fraud being found, the firm prefers to employ more conforming earnings
management strategies, which is consistent with the results in Erickson et al. (2004), who
document that their sample of firms with fraudulent financial reporting relied on significant
amounts of conforming earnings management. In sum, these results show that when the firm
has motivations to turn losses into gains, the firm prefers to employ more conforming earnings
management strategies; when the firm engages in fraudulent activities, the firm prefers to
employ less nonconforming earnings management strategies.
In summary, we confirm H1 and H2 by descriptive statistics and multivariate tests. Different
motivations do influence the choice of earnings management strategies, specifically, when the
firm has motivations to turn losses into gains and has the motivation to avoid penalty cost
associating with fraud being found, the firm prefers to employ more conforming earnings
management strategies.
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Symbol Coefficient Sig. Z value
(Constant) ? -1.96 0.053 3.732
TLTG － -1.903* 0.078 3.096
FRAUD － -0.900** 0.022 5.248
REV_ONLY ? 0.685* 0.067 3.361
EXP_ONLY ? -0.262 0.577 0.311
LAG_DTE － 8.372 0.308 1.041
LNLAG_TA ? 0.190** 0.050 3.834
Note: *, **, *** indicate the coefficient is significant at the level of 10%, 5%, 1%.
TLTG, which represents turning losses into gains, equals 1 if the firm turns losses into gains in
year t, and 0 otherwise. FRAUD, which represents fraudulent activities, equals 1 if the firm
engages in fraudulent activities in year t, and 0 otherwise. REV_ONLY, control variable, equals 1
if the firm only restates revenue accounts in year t, and 0 otherwise. EXP_ONLY, control
variable, equals 1 if the firm only restates expense accounts in year t, and 0 otherwise.
LAG_DTE equals deferred tax expense in year t-1, scaled by total assets at year-end t-2.
LAG_TA equals logarithm of total assets at year-end t-1. 
Table 5. Logistic regression of Model (1)
6. Conclusions and Recommendations
Based on CAS2006, we examine listed companies’ choice of two types of earnings
management: book-tax conforming and book-tax nonconforming. And we also examine how
firm-specific motivations and purposes impact the choice among these earnings management
strategies. We base our analyses on a sample of firms that restated their earnings (and thus
had managed earnings), and we measure conforming and nonconforming earnings
management by using the changes in current and deferred tax expense account disclosed in
originally and restated financial statements. We compare the relative amounts of changes in
current and deferred tax expense to judge which type of earnings management a firm is
engaged in.
Using hand-collected data from the misstatement firms’ financial statements, we get values of
the variables in Model (1). Then we get the conclusions by analyzing results of descriptive
statistics and correlation test and logistic regression of Model (1).
The study indicates that when the firm has motivations to turn losses into gains and has the
motivation to avoid penalty cost associating with fraud being found, the firm prefers to employ
more conforming earnings management strategies. Based on the study, we present several
policy recommendations to regulate earnings management.
6.1. Improve Accounting Standards
The relevant authorities should learn from the relevant provisions of international accounting
standards to improve and revise our existing accounting standards and its core ideas should be
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to narrow space that firms are free to choose. Specifically, the language and concept of
accounting standards should be standardized; reduce the alternative accounting policies and
methods; minimize management's accounting estimates and professional judgment;
standardize changing conditions of accounting policies and accounting estimates and
corrections of accounting error.
6.2. Optimization Pay System
Currently, managers’ revenues consist of basic salary and bonus in most enterprises and the
basic salary and bonus are linked to managers’ performance. It can be seen that managers’
compensation mechanisms not only incentive managers to focus on financial performance of
corporate, but also induce earnings management activities. Therefore, to optimize the
compensation mechanisms is an effective method to prevent earnings management activities.
On the one hand, combine long-term development of the firm to managers’ revenues; on the
other hand, give managers the appropriate option awards to align the interests of managers
and shareholders together, so that to promote managers to pay more attention to the firm’s
long-term development and thus weaken their incentives to manage earnings.
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